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Introduction
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is the
largest federal transfer program targeted on workers
with disabilities. It dominates all other government
programs aimed at this population. It replaces the
earnings of those workers who, due to a health
condition, are no longer able to perform any sub-
stantial gainful activity. Like all transfer programs
triggered by lost earnings, SSDI may have the
unintended consequence of discouraging work.
United States public policy toward people with
disabilities took a major turn in the 1990s with the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA). It is the centerpiece of a new effort by
government to keep people with disabilities in the
workforce. Title I of the ADA requires employers to
make reasonable accommodations for workers with
disabilities unless this would cause undue hardship
to the operation of business. One of the hopes under-
lying the ADA is that accommodation at the onset
of a health condition will delay job exit and a subse-
quent move onto the disability rolls. While the onset
of a health based work limitation will affect a
worker’s ability to remain on the job, it does not
necessarily result in a swift and certain job exit and
transition onto the disability rolls. The decision to
leave the workforce and apply for SSDI benefits can
be influenced both positively and negatively by
policy variables. These two policy thrusts—SSDI
transfers to replace lost earnings and accommoda-
tion to increase duration on the job—can send mixed
signals to workers who experience the onset of a
disability. Hence, understanding how such policies
influence behavior for those who experience a
disability is critical in developing policies that fully
integrate people with disabilities into the workforce.
Influences of Policy Variables
Using retrospective data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) together with matching
state level data on SSDI allowance rates and indi-
vidual level Social Security administrative record
data on the generosity of SSDI benefits, we estimate
the relative importance of policy variables—em-
ployer accommodation as well as the relative value
and likelihood of acceptance onto the SSDI pro-
gram—on the timing of SSDI application following
the onset of a disability. The results show that
employer accommodation significantly slows a
worker’s application for SSDI benefits while easier
access to SSDI benefits and more generous SSDI
benefits increase the speed of application following
the onset of a health condition.
Higher SSDI benefit levels increase the benefit
received each year by workers during the post-
application period and will lead to quicker SSDI
application. A relatively high probability of accep-
tance is expected to increase the likely benefits
received by workers each year during the post-
application period and speed the time to application.
We assume that the probability of a successful award
by a worker is a function of the allowance rate for
SSDI applicants in the worker’s state of residence.
Workers who live in states with relatively easy and
porous screening processes have a higher probabil-
ity of initial acceptance, and thus a higher expected
yearly benefits in their post-application period will
induce them to apply sooner than other workers.
Because Social Security Administration guidelines
for eligibility include medical as well as vocational
criteria we also assume that those workers with
health conditions that are more serious are more
likely to be accepted, as are those whose vocational
characteristics are weaker—poor education, older,
manual laborers, etc.—and thus both are likely to
apply more quickly.
Econometric Analysis
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a longi-
tudinal data set that tracks the behavior and eco-
nomic well-being of a representative cohort of men
and women born between 1931 and 1941 and their
spouses through their retirement years. Three waves
of data are now available. In 1992 (Wave 1), a total
of 12,654 men and women from 7,607 households
were asked detailed questions regarding their labor
force participation, health status, family structure,
disability status, wealth holdings, and income.
These data were then match to restricted Social
Security Administration records that contain a
respondent’s social security earning records.
In the first wave of the HRS, 1,280 men and 1,338
women report having an impairment or health
problem that both limited the kind or amount of
paid work they could perform and that they expected
to last for at least three months. Of these, 848 men
and 642 women said they were working for someone
else (not self-employed) at the onset of this disabil-
ity. Of these respondents, we use 577 men and 422
women in our analysis. Most of the final round of
respondents were excluded because they experi-
enced the onset of their disability prior to 1974, the
first year we have information on state allowance
rates.
The institutions workers face following the onset of
a disability have a significant effect on the timing of
their SSDI application. Using retrospective data
from the HRS we find that Social Security policy
variables—the state allowance rate and the size of
one’s SSDI benefit—significantly influence the
speed to SSDI application following the onset of a
disability.
Findings
With the aid of an econometric model, we find that
higher state allowance rates increase the hazard of
SSDI application. A 20 percent increase in state
allowance rates at the mean value of all other
variables would reduce male expected duration
before application for SSDI benefits by 0.83 years, a
decline from 10.45 to 9.62 years. The decline for
women is even higher—from 10.99 to 9.52 years.
In that same hazard model we also find that those
with larger disability benefits also have a significantly
greater risk of SSDI application. A 20 percent increase
in benefits would reduce expected duration prior to
SSDI application for both men and women by over
two years.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was
meant to increase the willingness of employers to
provide accommodation to workers with disabili-
ties. We find that workers who were accommodated
following the onset of their disability had signifi-
cantly lower risks of applying for SSDI benefits
within the first three years of onset. When employer
accommodations were included in our hazard
model, we found they significantly reduced the risk
of application. Universal employer accommodation
would increase expected duration in employment
of men by 3.13 years. For women, expected dura-
tion in employment would increase by 2.62 years.
Without question, the onset of a disability dramati-
cally increases the risk of application for SSDI. But
our results suggest most workers do not immediately
apply for SSDI benefits—the median male did not
apply for SSDI benefits until the seventh year follow-
ing the point at which his health condition began to
bother him. The median female did not apply until
the eighth year following the onset of her disability.
This does not mean that health has no influence on
work or application for benefits. In fact, we find
that even within our population with disabilities,
the severity of one’s health condition and the type
of health condition influence the speed to applica-
tion. We find those with multiple conditions apply
significantly sooner. We also find that those with
musculoskeletal conditions are significantly slower
to apply than those with other conditions. But we
find that economic and demographic variables also
significantly influence application speed. Those
workers with higher earnings and those who live in
states with a lower unemployment rate, those with
more years of education, as well as those who were
younger at onset and who are non-black are all
slower to apply for benefits.
Conclusion
From a public policy perspective, policy variables
significantly influence the speed to application for
SSDI benefits. Our findings suggest that moving
toward pro-work policies that, for instance, encour-
age greater employer accommodation following the
onset of a disability or away from policies that make
SSDI easier to obtain and more valuable to receive,
would significantly slow the speed to SSDI applica-
tion, retaining workers longer in the workforce.
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